Washington International Law Journal
Volume 17

Number 1

1-1-2008

Vietnam's Decree on Microfinance: A Flawed Attempt to Create an
Enabling Legal Environment for Microfinance
Elin M. King

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wilj
Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, and the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Elin M. King, Comment, Vietnam's Decree on Microfinance: A Flawed Attempt to Create an Enabling Legal
Environment for Microfinance, 17 Pac. Rim L & Pol'y J. 187 (2008).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wilj/vol17/iss1/8

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington International Law Journal by an authorized editor of
UW Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@uw.edu.

Copyright © 2008 Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal Association

VIETNAM’S DECREE ON MICROFINANCE: A FLAWED
ATTEMPT TO CREATE AN ENABLING LEGAL
ENVIRONMENT FOR MICROFINANCE
Elin M. King†
Abstract: Despite its increasing as a development tool microfinance still faces
significant barriers in reaching the poorest of the poor. Microfinance programs often
respond well to short-term needs but are not designed to handle the long-term struggles
faced by lending institutions. To resolve these problems, many in the microfinance field
have begun to tout the concept of creating “enabling” legal and regulatory frameworks.
Such an enabling environment would ideally eliminate unreasonable barriers to entry into
the field, encourage innovation, and reinforce industry best practices. An enabling
regulatory scheme could also increase legal certainty, encourage more investors to enter
the field and allow microfinance institutions (“MFIs”) to raise money by accessing world
financial markets.
In an effort to create such an enabling environment, Vietnam passed a Microfinance
Decree in 2004, creating a separate regulatory scheme for microfinance institutions.
Prior to the passage of the Microfinance Decree, the legal status of microfinance
institutions in Vietnam was very ambiguous. Although the Microfinance Decree creates
a more predictable and stable environment, it does not achieve many of the goals of an
“enabling” environment, and it threatens the viability of many of the MFIs already
operating in Vietnam. The new framework makes strides by clarifying the legal status of
MFIs and allowing them to become deposit-taking institutions under limited
circumstances.
The new law also contains provisions aimed at increasing
professionalism and encouraging long-term planning. Unfortunately, the Microfinance
Decree also contains provisions that may discourage commercial and foreign investment
in microfinance and create unnecessary burdens for small MFIs. In order for Vietnam to
truly enable the growth of microfinance it should enact new provisions to protect small
MFIs, encourage new players to enter the microfinance field, and continue to develop the
regulations underpinning the Microfinance Decree.

I.

INTRODUCTION

In 2006, Mohammad Yunus and the Grameen Bank won the Nobel
Peace Prize “for their efforts to create economic and social development
from below.”1 Neither a politician nor a traditional peace activist,
Mohammad Yunus is, instead, an economist who developed a system of
advancing small loans to people living in impoverished conditions.2 What
started as a social experiment three decades ago has blossomed into a major
†
The author would like to thank Professors Veronica Taylor and Jane Winn and the journal
editorial staff.
1
Press Release, Nobel Foundation, The Nobel Peace Prize for 2006 (Oct. 13, 2006),
http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2006/press.html.
2
Michael Phillips et al., 'Microloan' Father Yunus Is Awarded Nobel Peace Prize—Bank Spurred
Global Movement Through Aid to Women, Poor; Major Insurers Following Suit, WALL ST. J., Oct. 14,
2006, at B1.
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development tool used in many parts of the world.3 Proponents claim that
microfinance is an important tool that will help raise the status of women
and alleviate poverty.4
Despite examples of success such as the Grameen Bank, however,
most MFIs are unable to maintain viability over the long term.5 Of the large
number of MFIs operating worldwide, only around sixty have a sustainable
or near sustainable financial model.6 The majority of MFIs cannot meet the
demand for financial services with traditional funding sources.7 Although
many MFIs would like to launch more sophisticated financial programs,
barriers such as financial requirements set by central banks, prohibitions on
savings mobilization, and interest rate subsidies in many countries prevent
most MFIs from becoming anything more than donor-dependent grassroots
lending programs.8
The precarious financial position of many MFIs severely limits their
ability to expand offerings and to meet the needs of the poorest of the poor.9
Although a number of reforms have been proposed to deal with these issues,
many development agencies, such as the World Bank, have begun to focus
on the need for legal and regulatory reform.10 In response, a handful of
countries have either passed or are in the process of drafting “enabling”
legislation.11 Such an enabling environment would, ideally, eliminate
unreasonable barriers to entry into the field, encourage innovation, and
reinforce industry best practices. An enabling regulatory scheme would also

3
For a summary of microfinance initiatives in many different countries, see United Nations
Resource Library—Country Profiles, http://www.yearofmicrocredit.org/pages/reslib/reslib_country_
profiles.asp (last visited Apr. 17, 2007).
4
Betsy Cummings, Tiny Loans Stimulate the Appetite for More, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2005, at C1.
5
ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, FINANCE FOR THE POOR: MICROFINANCE DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY
17 (2000).
6
Aaron Jones, Promotion of Commercially-Viable Microfinance Sector in Emerging Markets, 13
GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 187, 195 (2006).
7
JOSELITO GALLARDO, THE WORLD BANK, FRAMEWORK FOR REGULATING MICROFINANCE
INSTITUTIONS: THE EXPERIENCE IN GHANA AND IN THE PHILIPPINES 4 (2002).
8
The Legal and Regulatory Framework Required to Enable Micro-finance Institutions to Operate
Effectively, COUNTDOWN 2005: NEWSL. OF MICROCREDIT SUMMIT CAMPAIGN, May 2001, available at
http://www.microcreditsummit.org/newsletter/aprms5.htm [hereinafter NEWSLETTER OF MICROCREDIT
SUMMIT CAMPAIGN].
9
Jones, supra note 6, at 194. There are many different viewpoints on who fits into the category of
the “poorest of the poor.” See generally Measuring Poverty, http://go.worldbank.org/ZL042FVII0 (last
visited Apr. 17, 2007).
10
GALLARDO, supra note 7, at 4.
11
For information on the current status of legislation in many countries, see Microfinance
Regulation and Supervision Resource Center, http://microfinancegateway.com/resource_centers/reg_sup
(last visited Apr. 17, 2007).
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increase legal certainty, encouraging more investors to enter the field and
allowing MFIs to raise money by accessing world financial markets.12
In 2004, Vietnam promulgated a decree (“Microfinance Decree”)
regulating all microfinance institutions.13 While this new system creates a
more predictable and stable environment, it does not achieve many of the
goals of an “enabling” environment, and it threatens the viability of many
MFIs already operating in Vietnam. In order for microfinance to achieve its
maximum potential in Vietnam, the legal framework needs to be changed to
protect small, grassroots level MFIs, encourage the participation of foreign
and commercial players, and reinforce industry best practices.
Part II of this comment examines why microfinance has become a
major international development tool. Part III discusses the current trend
towards regulating microfinance.
Part IV examines the history of
microfinance in Vietnam and evaluates the effectiveness of provisions
included in the Microfinance Decree. Part V argues that Vietnam should
make changes to protect small MFIs, encourage the participation of
commercial and foreign players, and continue to develop the underlying
regulatory scheme to improve the effectiveness of microfinance in Vietnam.
II.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF MICROFINANCE: FROM SOCIAL EXPERIMENT TO
MAJOR DEVELOPMENT TOOL

Microfinance started out as a small-scale grassroots attempt to
alleviate poverty. Over the last 30 years, it has expanded into a major
development tool. Although this growth has met with some success, it has
also revealed many of the limitations facing microfinance. In an effort to
strengthen microfinance, many practitioners and scholars have begun to
examine the possibility of using legal and regulatory reform to address these
concerns.
A.

Microfinance Has Grown from a Small-Scale Social Experiment to a
Major Development Tool

Microfinance is the provision of simple banking services to poor
households and people.14 Microfinance is an umbrella term for a host of
services including deposits, loans, payment services, money transfers, and
12

Jones, supra note 6, at 204.
Decree of the Government on Organization and Operation of Micro Finance Institutions in
Vietnam, 28/2005/ ND—CP (2005) available at http://microfinancegateway.org/files/25507_file_Decree_
on_org_and_op_of_MFIs_in_Vietnam.pdf. [hereinafter Microfinance Decree].
14
Jones, supra note 6, at 187.
13
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insurance.15 Traditionally, the emphasis for microfinance has been on
microcredit, a system of advancing small loans to low-income households to
use in income-generating activities.16 Because the majority of MFIs today
focus almost exclusively on microcredit, the two terms are used almost
interchangeably.17 For this analysis, however, the terms will be used as
separate concepts.
Muhammad Yunus developed the earliest efforts in microfinance.18
Yunus believed that poverty could be significantly alleviated by giving the
poor opportunities to start their own small businesses.19 In 1974, Yunus
loaned forty-two basket weavers the equivalent of twenty-seven dollars to
start their own small businesses.20 Despite the fact that there were no signed
agreements and no collateral attached to the loans, all forty-two participants
repaid the loans in full.21 Encouraged by his success, Yunus went on to
found the Grameen Bank.22 As of 2005, the Grameen Bank had 1740
branches with 5.6 million customers.23
Since Yunus’ initial experiment, microcredit has become a major
international development tool. Studies have shown that microfinance is
effective at helping the poor to “improve household and enterprise
management, increase productivity, smooth income flows and consumption
costs, enlarge and diversify their microbusinesses, and increase their
incomes.”24 A dramatic indicator of the international community’s
acceptance of microcredit is the fact that the United Nations declared 2005
the “International Year of Microcredit.”25 Encouraged by the success of
Mohommad Yunus and the Grameen Bank, many organizations have since
followed suit offering microcredit programs around the world.26 Although
15

Isobel Coleman, Defending Microfinance, 29-WTR FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 181, 182 (2005).
Kenneth Anderson, Microcredit: Fulfilling or Belying the Universalist Morality of Globalizing
Markets?, 5 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 85, 90-91 (2002).
17
Khandakar Elahi & Danopoulos, Microfinance and Third World Development: A Critical
Analysis, 32 J. POL. & MILITARY SOC. 61, 62 (2004).
18
For a detailed history of Muhammad Yunus’ pioneering efforts, see MUHAMMAD YUNUS & ALAN
JOLIS, BANKER TO THE POOR: MICRO-LENDING AND THE BATTLE AGAINST WORLD POVERTY (1999).
19
Connie Bruck, Millions for Millions, NEW YORKER, Oct. 30, 2006, at 62.
20
Id.
21
Celia Dugger, Peace Prize to Pioneer of Loans for Those Too Poor to Borrow, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
14, 2006, at A1.
22
YUNUS & JOLIS, supra note 18, at xi.
23
Key Information of the Grammen Bank, http://www.grameen-info.org/infoharvus$.html (last
visited Apr. 17, 2007).
24
MARGUERITE S. ROBINSON, THE MICROFINANCE REVOLUTION: SUSTAINABLE FINANCE FOR THE
POOR 6 (2001).
25
International Year of Microcredit 2005, http://www.yearofmicrocredit.org (last visited Apr. 17,
2007).
26
Phillips et al., supra note 2.
16
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the vast majority of microfinance programs are run by non-profit
institutions, a few commercial banks, such as Citibank and HSBC, have
begun to experiment with microfinance programs.27 Many high-tech
philanthropists, such as the founders of Dell, Google, and Microsoft, have
also donated large sums of money to expanding the scope of microfinance
programs.28 As of 2005, there were over 10,000 MFIs operating throughout
the world.29 These institutions made 100 million microloans in 2005.30
Although the majority of programs have focused on microcredit, many
advocates are calling for the expansion to other microfinance services.31
B.

Despite Some Success, Most Microfinance Programs Fail to Reach
Maximum Effectiveness

Despite the rapid expansion of microfinance services over the last
three decades, MFIs face a number of significant hurdles to reaching their
maximum potential and becoming sustainable institutions. Although a few
well-known MFIs have had considerable success, many early microfinance
efforts were ad-hoc programs without a well-defined strategy.32 The Asian
Development Bank (“ADB”), one of the major backers of microfinance
programs in Asia, said that its own early microfinance attempts paid little
attention to financial viability and were poorly targeted.33 Over the years, a
large portion of microfinance programs have been dependent on private
donor or government funding.34 Although both public and private sources
are crucial to the development of microfinance, each source comes with its
unique problems. Private donors, although well intentioned, often want to
see immediate results.35 This creates pressure on MFIs to implement too
hastily, often before spending adequate time identifying target groups and
tailoring programs to local needs.36 Government-run microfinance programs
27
Eric Bellman, Invisible Hand: Entrepreneur Gets Big Banks to Back Very Small Loans—
icrolending-for-Profit Effort In India Draws Business From Citigroup, HSBC—Ms. Dobbala's Baby
Buffalo, WALL ST. J. (Eastern Edition), May 15, 2006, at A1.
28
Bruck, supra note 19.
29
Phillips et al., supra note 2.
30
Id.
31
ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, supra note 5, at 22.
32
BRETT E. COLEMAN, ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, THE ROLE OF THE ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK
IN PROMOTING THE DEVELOPMENT OF MICROFINANCE IN LAO PDR AND VIET NAM 2 (2003), available at
http://www.microfinancegateway.org/files/27552_file_6.pdf.
33
Id.
34
ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, supra note 5, at 17.
35
Celia R. Taylor, Microcredit as Model: A Critique of State/NGO Relations, 29 SYRACUSE J. INT’L.
L. & COM. 303, 327-28 (2002).
36
Id.
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also face their own challenges, often having distorted policy environments
and lacking a business culture.37
Unfortunately, the legal and regulatory environment in some countries
prevents MFIs from adopting many sustainable practices. One way to help
MFIs become sustainable institutions is to allow MFIs to become deposittaking institutions.38 By leveraging deposits, MFIs are able to continue
issuing microloans without being as dependent on outside sources.39
Unfortunately, although some MFIs have indicated interest in coupling
microsavings programs with microcredit, the legal and regulatory
environment of most countries makes this impracticable.40 Targeted towards
traditional banking, many countries’ banking laws set requirements for
deposit-taking institutions that are unrealistic for the majority of MFIs.41
Capital requirements, reporting protocols, and taxation policies may all
prevent MFIs from mobilizing savings.42
Allowing MFIs to become formal financial institutions could also
allow them greater access to international financial markets.43 Traditional
banks are hesitant to invest in MFIs unless they have appropriate legal and
financial standing.44 Outside investors may also be unwilling to back MFIs
“unless appropriate performance standards and regulation and supervision
regimes are developed and enforced and measures are introduced to protect
public deposits.”45 In addition to increasing private investment, many are
hopeful that if MFIs become viable finance institutions, they may be able to
raise money through securities issued in the formal financial market.46
C.

An Enabling Legal and Regulatory Environment Can Help Maximize
the Potential of Microfinance

Although there are many factors that need to be addressed before
MFIs can reach their maximum potential,47 one key component is creating
37

COLEMAN, supra note 32, at 2.
GALLARDO, supra note 7, at 4.
39
Id.
40
NEWSLETTER OF MICROCREDIT SUMMIT CAMPAIGN, supra note 8.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
GALLARDO, supra note 7, at 4.
44
Id. at 2.
45
COLEMAN, supra note 32, at 3.
46
GALLARDO, supra note 7, at 4.
47
Other significant factors that need to be addressed include the lack of transportation, irrigation and
telecommunications infrastructure. Pierre Fallavier, Developing Micro-Finance Institutions in Vietnam:
Policy Implications to Set up An Enabling Environment 55 (1994) (M.A. thesis, McGill University),
available at http://www.arts.uwaterloo.ca/~vecon/download/fallavier/mfi_vnm.pdf.
38
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an “enabling” legal and regulatory framework.48 Rather than correcting
perceived abuses in an industry, “enabling” legislation aims to encourage
new institutions or improve the performance of existing ones.49 Examples of
enabling legislation include revising existing banking regulations to allow
deposit-taking,50 removing interest rate subsidies,51 and encouraging
industry best practices by setting up MFI-appropriate auditing and reporting
requirements.52 Creating an enabling legal and regulatory environment
could remove the barriers that prevent MFIs from becoming deposit-taking
institutions.53 Having a positive and predictable regulatory environment
could also encourage existing microfinance backers to expand their current
services. For example, in a survey of existing microfinance institutions
conducted in Vietnam, most programs stated that they had no plan to expand
their geographic scope or to offer new services.54 Most of these programs
pointed to “the lack of a clear legal and regulatory framework” as a key
reason for their hesitancy to expand.55 In addition, many of the major
institutional donors have begun to scrutinize individual countries’ legal and
regulatory frameworks before deciding to invest.56 The ADB, one of the
largest donors providing funding and technical support in Asia, now has a
policy of not assisting microfinance programs in countries with an
unfavorable policy environment.57
III.

ALTHOUGH MICROFINANCE IN VIETNAM HAS HAD SOME SUCCESS,
ENABLING LEGISLATION COULD HELP MFIS ADVANCE

Vietnam’s experience provides an interesting case study for other
countries considering implementing microfinance laws. Although there are
a few other countries with some form of microfinance legal framework,
Vietnam’s framework is one of the newest. Rather than create a framework
piece by piece, Vietnam instead drafted its new law after undertaking a study
48

ROBERT CHRISTEN ET AL., CONSULTATIVE GROUP TO ASSIST THE POOR & WORLD BANK,
MICROFINANCE CONSENSUS GUIDELINES: GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON REGULATION AND SUPERVISION OF
MICROFINANCE 8 (July 2003), available at http://microfinancegateway.org/files/13473_13473.pdf.
49
Id.
50
Id. at 10.
51
KATE DRUSCHEL & ANNA BANTUG-HERRARA, USAID, MICRONOTE 10: THE ULTIMATE
BALANCING ACT: INVESTOR CONFIDENCE AND REGULATORY CONSIDERATIONS FOR MICROFINANCE
(2005), available at http://www.microlinks.org/ev_en.php?ID=9097_201&ID2=DO_TOPIC.
52
CHRISTEN ET AL., supra note 48, at 10.
53
GALLARDO, supra note 7, at 4.
54
COLEMAN, supra note 32, at 18.
55
Id.
56
Id. at 2.
57
Id.
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financed by the ADB.58 Vietnam also has a fairly well-developed
microfinance sector. It will be instructive to observe the effects of the new
framework on already existing programs. Examining the considerations that
went into the new law, as well as its effects on the microfinance sector, will
help other countries as they consider whether and how to attempt creating an
enabling microfinance framework.
A.

Despite Vietnam’s Strong History of Supporting Microfinance, There
Is Much Room for Improvement

Vietnam has a strong history of encouraging the development of
financial services for the poor.
Vietnam’s first experiments with
microfinance came with the Doi Moi reforms of the 1980s.59 Formerly
under a Soviet-style communist system, in 1985 Vietnam instituted a number
of free-market economic reforms, eventually allowing private ownership of
land.60 Previously, the central planning model generally ignored the
financial needs of individuals and instead focused on financing state-owned
enterprises.61 Gradually, the State Bank of Vietnam (“State Bank”) began to
recognize the need for decentralized financial services targeted toward the
general population.62 In 1990, the State Bank set up the Vietnam Bank for
Agriculture (“VBA”) specifically to provide credit in rural areas at
subsidized interest rates.63
Despite some success, the VBA was not able to meet the full demand
for loans and the government responded by creating People’s Credit Funds
(“PCFs”) and the Vietnam Bank for the Poor (“VBP”).64 Created in 1994,
PCFs were modeled after the credit-and-savings model developed by Yunus,
with regional and national credit unions set up to advise local groups.65 The
VBP, started a year later in 1995, was set up to offer collateral-free
subsidized credit services to individuals too poor to qualify for other
programs.66 All three programs were able to reach a large number of
customers in a short time. By 1996, the VBA had over 1800 branches
providing credit to 7 million families, 674 PCFs were operating with
58
B. BYAMBASAIKHAN, ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, TECHNICAL ASSISTANT COMPLETION REPORT:
TA 3741-VIE (2004), available at http://www.adb.org/Documents/TACRs/VIE/tacr-vie-3741.pdf.
59
Fallavier, supra note 47, at 48.
60
See id.
61
Id. at 64.
62
Id. at 65.
63
Id. at 65-66.
64
Id. at 66.
65
Id. at 65-66.
66
Id. at 66.
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275,000 members, and the VBP had dispersed loans to approximately 1.3
million families.67 Also during this same time period, a number of MFIs
operated by non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”) began work in
Vietnam.68 As of 2005, with the government and NGO programs combined,
an estimated 70% of rural households were receiving some sort of MFI
service.69
Despite commendable efforts by both the public and the private
sectors, there is still considerable room for improvement. Although Vietnam
is currently the second fastest growing economy in Asia,70 as of 2004, it still
had a poverty rate of 28.9%.71 MFIs may reach a large section of rural
households, but overall, 40% of poor households still do not have access to
credit, either through formal or informal services.72 When they do have
access, it is generally only to short-term microcredit and not to other
financial services.73 Because of the subsidized interest rates offered by
government programs, small NGO-run MFIs are often forced to operate at
interest rates too low to allow them to break even, much less expand their
offerings.74 A lack of commercialized distribution channels75 and poor
transportation and telecommunications infrastructure76 also prevent existing
programs from reaching the poorest of the poor.77 Even when MFIs operate
in very impoverished areas, many people do not take advantage of
opportunities because they do not understand the paperwork involved, are
not aware of the existence of the programs, or the programs are not tailored
to their individual circumstances.78

67

Id. at 65-66.
Id. at 68.
69
Doan Anh Tuan, Vietnam’s New Law on Microfinance: On the Way to an Enabling Environment 4
(Consultative Group to Assist the Poor, Essays on Regulation and Supervision No. 17, 2005).
70
Joan L. Levinstein & Clay Chandler, Vietnam VroooooM: Asia's Second-Fastest-Growing
Economy is Surging Ahead—and Taking Its Place on the Global Stage, FORTUNE, Dec. 11, 2006, at 147.
71
Tuan, supra note 69, at 3.
72
Daniel L. Zook, The Vietnamese Microfinance Sector 3 (The William Davidson Inst., Policy
Briefs No. 35, 2005) available at http://www.wdi.umich.edu/Publications/PolicyBriefs.
73
Tuan, supra note 69, at 5.
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
Fallavier, supra note 47, at 55.
77
Id.
78
Id. at 59.
68
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Before Passage of the Microfinance Decree, the Ambiguous Legal
Status of MFIs Prevented Further Expansion of the Microfinance
Sector

Before passage of the Microfinance Decree, the only legal guidance
covering MFIs was the Law on Credit Institutions (“Credit Institutions
Law”), a general banking law that did not anticipate the unique features and
challenges that would arise with the development of microfinance.79 The
Credit Institutions Law regulates the “organization and operation of credit
institutions and banking activities of other organizations.”80 The Credit
Institutions Law defines “credit institutions” as enterprises that receive
deposits, extend credit, and provide banking services.81 It also defines a
class of “non-bank credit institutions,” which provide some banking services
but do not receive deposits or accept payment services.82 Although this
definition appears to cover MFIs, only joint-venture and 100% foreignowned non-bank credit institutions are allowed to apply for this status.83
The Credit Institutions Law does not specifically address the status of
MFIs.84 It states that those offering financial services without a license are
subject to administrative sanctions and possibly even criminal prosecution.85
Because MFIs could not establish themselves as independent institutions and
did not want to violate banking laws, most operated as “projects” attached to
other social programs.86 Most microfinance programs had more than one
agency involved, and it was often unclear who had ownership rights to a
specific program.87 This lack of ownership transparency made many
agencies hesitant about the longer-term sustainability and accountability of
microfinance programs.88
Although already-existing MFIs seem willing to bear the risk of
offering loans in an unpredictable policy environment, many MFIs are
unwilling to expand their offerings or to increase the scale of their
operations.89 When surveyed, the majority of MFIs in Vietnam said that the

79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89

Law 02-1997-QH10 on Credit Institutions (Vietnam) [hereinafter Credit Institutions Law].
Id. at preamble.
Id. art. 20(1).
Id. art. 20(3).
Id. art. 107.
See generally Credit Institutions Law, supra note 79.
Id. arts. 125(1), 126.
Tuan, supra note 69, at 9.
Zook, supra note 72, at 4.
Id.
ADAM MCCARTY, MICROFINANCE IN VIETNAM: A SURVEY OF SCHEMES AND ISSUES 23 (2001).
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most pressing need was for change to the legal environment facing MFIs.90
The ADB, one of the primary microfinance donors in the region, has made
legal reform one of the key conditions for its continued assistance with
microfinance programs in Vietnam.91 The World Bank’s Rural Finance
Program has also been unable to disburse funds to Vietnamese MFIs because
the programs lack a clear legal status.92 A legal system that provides
licensing gives MFIs a government stamp of approval, which, in turn, may
make it easier for MFIs to access commercial financial markets.93 Many
commercial banks and other capital lending institutions are also unwilling to
lend to microfinance programs that are not licensed.94
Outside of the ambiguous status of MFI loan programs, the Credit
Institutions Law specifically prohibits offering certain financial services.95
Payment and treasury services,96 participation in the national monetary
market,97 and engaging in the insurance business are all practices
specifically limited to recognized credit institutions.98 Arguably, the
government has an interest in making sure that these types of services are
limited to reputable companies. Yet, although these services are offered
through traditional banks, they are usually not offered on terms that are
realistic for the poor.99
Traditional banks are also ineffective at offering services in many
geographically remote areas.100
Studies in other countries have
demonstrated that there is a vast demand for microfinance services that are
not currently offered.101 In particular, there is a growing demand for
microsavings and microcredit services to help poor families weather
financial risks such as illness, death of a family member, and natural

90

Id.
B. COLEMAN, ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC
OF VIET NAM FOR IMPLEMENTING THE REGULATORY AND SUPERVISORY FRAMEWORK FOR MICROFINANCE
3-4 (2005).
92
NGUYEN THI HIEN CHI, JOINT VIENNA INSTITUTION, PRO-POOR FINANCIAL SYSTEM
DEVELOPMENT 13 (2004).
93
Jones, supra note 6, at 201.
94
Zook, supra note 72, at 4.
95
Credit Institutions Law, supra note 79, ch. 3, § 4, art. 70.
96
Id. ch. 3, § 3.
97
Id. ch. 3, § 4, art. 70.
98
Id. ch. 3, § 4, art. 74.
99
CHI, supra note 92, at 10.
100
Fallavier, supra note 47, at 53.
101
ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, supra note 5, at 10-11.
See Country Profiles,
http://www.yearofmicrocredit.org/pages/reslib/reslib_country_profiles.asp (last visited Apr. 24, 2007), for
country-specific information.
91
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disasters.102 An enabling framework could allow MFIs to offer a wider
range of microfinance services while at the same time ensuring that these
new services are offered by stable accredited institutions.
Another often cited barrier to the growth of the microfinance sector in
Vietnam is the government policy of offering subsidized interest rates in
state-administered MFI programs.103 Bank lending rates are capped at
approximately 12-14% per annum.104 The VBP has a policy of charging 89% while many other national programs offer rates that are even lower.105
MFIs operating in Vietnam contend that in order to compete with
government programs, they are forced to offer comparable interest rates.106
At these interest rates, MFIs are unable to break even, much less expand
their offerings.107 Research in other countries has demonstrated that the poor
are willing to pay high interest rates to have access to financial services.108
MFI operators insist that eliminating interest rate subsidies would encourage
efficiency and allow MFIs to establish sustainable business models.109
IV.

ALTHOUGH THE MICROFINANCE DECREE ESTABLISHES SOME
PREDICTABILITY, ITS ACTUAL IMPACT MAY YIELD MIXED RESULTS

Hoping to build on the existing microfinance framework, in January
2002, the government of Vietnam signed an agreement with ADB to receive
technical assistance in the development of new microfinance legislation.110
The final version of the Microfinance Decree was promulgated on March 9,
2004.111 The Microfinance Decree requires that all microfinance operators
transform into regulated MFIs by March 2007.112 The Microfinance Decree
does not, however, regulate PCFs or the VBP.113
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Now that Vietnam has passed a law specifically addressing the status
of MFIs, it is important to examine not only what the law says but also
whether the law meets the needs of the Vietnam microfinance sector.
Specifically, this section will examine the scope of the law, provisions
regulating deposit taking, finance activities allowed, measures to enforce
industry best practice, and requirements for MFIs ownership. Although on
the surface many of the provisions appear to boost the Microfinance sector,
some provisions may actually hurt existing MFIs.114 The new law also
reinforces the status quo rather than encouraging innovation.
A.

By Requiring All MFIs to Comply, the Microfinance Decree May Push
Smaller MFIs Out of Business

Forcing all MFIs to come up with legal capital unnecessarily curtails
small MFIs. Furthermore, it offers very little systemic benefit. The
Microfinance Decree, which regulates all MFIs operating in Vietnam,115
gives them two years from the date of enactment to comply with its
provisions.116 In order to continue operation, each MFI must establish legal
capital of 500 million VND ($31,400)117 and must apply for a license with
the State Bank.118 Although it is important that a new law provide stability
and predictability, bringing all MFIs under one umbrella may prove
counterproductive. An enabling law will ideally encourage willing MFIs to
expand outside the grassroots, donor-funded, microcredit model while still
protecting organizations that choose to follow the traditional model.119
An enabling law should not preclude the grassroots model for MFIs,
but forcing all MFIs to comply with registration requirements and to
establish legal capital may do exactly that. Small MFIs’ resources are
stretched so thin that they may not be able to generate the required legal
capital.120 Although already established MFIs may find ways to secure the
capital, the capital requirement may discourage the establishment of new
grassroots-level MFIs. There is a growing consensus that not all MFIs need
to be regulated.121 The main purpose of requiring legal capital is to ensure
that financial institutions do not pose a threat to the financial system as a
114
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whole.122 MFIs that only offer microloans do not pose a system-wide risk
because, if they fold, there is no negative repercussion to their clients (in
fact, it may provide a benefit because the clients may not have to repay their
loans).123 Government oversight is cost intensive, and regulating all MFIs
adds unnecessary administrative costs.124 Forcing all MFIs to come up with
legal capital could unnecessarily curtail small MFIs and otherwise offer very
little systemic benefit.125
B.

The New Microfinance Decree Improves Microfinance Regulation by
Allowing MFIs to Become Deposit-Taking Institutions

The most promising features of the Microfinance Decree are aimed at
allowing MFIs to become deposit-taking institutions.
First, the
Microfinance Decree allows MFIs to accept voluntary savings if they meet
certain conditions.126 Deposit-taking MFIs must meet a higher legal capital
requirement of five billion VND ($314,000).127 Second, before starting
savings programs, MFIs must also have received compulsory savings for at
least three years, have had sound operation for the last three years, have
adequate administrators, controllers and managers, and have sufficient
information systems.128 These new provisions are perhaps the most
beneficial contribution of the new Microfinance Decree because they outline
a clear, predictable route by which MFIs can become deposit-taking
institutions.129 The legal capital requirement is quite reasonable compared to
other countries in the region.130 Yet the capital requirement is high enough
to preserve stability in the financial system as a whole by ensuring that only
MFIs with adequate capital are offering deposit services. Requiring MFIs to
operate for three years also helps to minimize systemic risk by making sure
that only healthy MFIs become deposit-taking institutions. Third, the
personnel and information system requirements also ensure that MFIs have
the infrastructure in place to manage new deposits. Lastly, the opt-in nature
of these provisions allows MFIs to take on new programs and services on
their own timetable. This aspect of the new law encourages growth and
122
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minimizes systemic risk while still allowing MFIs to create their own
agendas.
C.

The Range of Services Authorized Under the Microfinance Decree
Will Allow MFIs to Expand the Scope of Their Operations

In addition to legitimizing programs already operating in Vietnam, the
Microfinance Decree authorizes three new microfinance activities. First, the
Microfinance Decree specifically allows capital mobilization through
compulsory and voluntary savings.131 Second, the Microfinance Decree
allows MFIs to work as agents for banks and insurance companies.132 Third,
the Microfinance Decree authorizes some payment services but does not
elaborate on what those payment services will be.133 The Microfinance
Decree does not, unfortunately, leave open the option to explore other
activities outside the services specifically authorized.134
By formally endorsing already existing programs, the Microfinance
Decree helps bring clarity to a previously confusing policy environment.
MFIs can feel confident that existing programs are now governmentsanctioned, which may make MFIs more willing to expand services into new
areas.135 One of the criticisms of Vietnam’s existing microfinance
environment is that the financial products available often do not meet the
needs of the poorest of the poor.136 Allowing a greater range of services also
gives MFIs more room to experiment with service offerings and to tailor
their programs to the needs of their most needy constituents.137
Although the new set of allowed activities gives MFIs some room to
expand their offerings, the law does not go as far as it should. MFIs are only
allowed to offer financial products listed in the Microfinance Decree.138
This new range of services gives MFIs room to expand and experiment, but
limits growth by not giving them the option to create innovative products.
Because the needs and financial problems of the poor are so unique, the
financial solutions to these problems may need to be non-traditional.139 It is
131
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understandable that Vietnam’s government may not want to give MFIs too
much leeway in creating new financial products that may pose some system
risk. However, modifying the legal structure to allow experimentation on a
case-by-case basis would open the field to innovation while still allowing the
government to maintain some level of control.
D.

Although the Microfinance Decree’s Provisions Aimed at Encouraging
Best Practices Will Raise the Level of Professionalism, They Will
Unduly Burden Small MFIs

The Microfinance Decree’s provisions aimed at encouraging industry
best practice will help to strengthen existing microfinance programs and to
raise professionalism in the industry. In order to apply for licensing, all
MFIs must submit a draft charter, a feasibility study, curriculum vitas of all
leaders, documentation on capital contributors, and information on the MFI’s
financial situation.140 The Microfinance Decree lays out organizational
governance standards, requiring that each MFI have a Board of
Management, an Audit Committee, and a Director.141 The Microfinance
Decree lists a number of factors which may disqualify a person from serving
in any of these positions, including having a criminal history, being a
representative of a company that failed because of bankruptcy or legal
violations, or being a close relative of someone else in management.142 The
Microfinance Decree authorizes the State Bank to set requirements for the
qualifications of each of these governing bodies.143 The Microfinance
Decree also authorizes the State Bank and the Ministry of Finance to
implement a standardized reporting and statistics system for all MFIs.144
On one hand, these new requirements take positive steps towards
enabling the microfinance industry in Vietnam. Requiring feasibility studies
will encourage MFIs to have well thought out long-range objectives and may
prevent the ad hoc attempts of the past. Setting minimum requirements for
leaders will also help to encourage professionalism in the industry and
prevent people with criminal pasts from entering the industry. A unified
reporting and statistic system could help MFIs share information with each
other and foster efforts to improve the industry as a whole.145 The reports
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could also help the Bank of Vietnam to assess the status of the industry and
develop policies that are more responsive to current needs.146
Unfortunately, compelling all MFIs to comply with licensing
requirements may also place undue burdens on cash-strapped, small MFIs.
Audits and statistical reports are often expensive and labor intensive. One
MFI in Latin America found that complying with reporting requirements in
their country cost an amount equal to 5% of their loan portfolio.147 Some
practitioners in the microfinance industry are also concerned that the
qualifications requirements for leaders will not be achievable.148 They are
also concerned that Vietnam does not have enough qualified individuals to
fill all the positions necessary.149 If this is true, there will be a higher than
normal demand for qualified individuals and small MFIs may not be able to
afford the salaries. This perceived shortage of qualified individuals will
most likely disappear over time, but in the short run small MFIs may not be
able to find leadership that qualifies them to register for MFI status.
E.

New Provisions Restricting MFI Ownership Unnecessarily Reinforce
the Status Quo

The Microfinance Decree lays out two types of organizations that may
establish MFIs in Vietnam. The first type consists of “[s]ocio-political
organizations, social organizations, socio-professional organizations of
Vietnam, charity funds and social funds.”150 The second group includes
“Vietnamese non-governmental organizations.”151 Conspicuously absent
from these groups are commercial organizations or foreign-run
organizations.152 The Microfinance Decree does allow foreign organizations
and individuals to contribute capital to authorized groups, but it does not
clarify what role these foreign entities may have in MFIs.153
The Microfinance Decree echoes provisions in the Credit Institutions
Law that discourage foreign financial institutions from participating in the
Vietnamese system.154 Discouraging the full participation of foreign and
commercial enterprises is short-sighted at best. Worldwide, foreign non146
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profits are important sources of MFI funding.155 In Vietnam, the presence of
foreign non-profits is still limited.156 Although the Microfinance Decree
provides predictability for domestic institutions, foreign institutions are left
in a policy environment just as unpredictable as before. Although they are
new players in the microfinance scene, commercial entities provide an
important source of possible future growth.157
Carlos Labarthe of
Compartamos, the largest microfinance institution in Latin America, argues
that within five years, 80-90% of microfinance institutions will be
commercial.158 Some scholars, policy-makers, and commentators contend
that commercialization is the only way to meet the vast demand for
microfinance services.159 Although it may be wise for the Vietnamese
government to develop guidelines that ensure commercial microfinance
programs fulfill social objectives, completely barring them from entering the
field discourages innovation.
V.

VIETNAM NEEDS TO PROTECT SMALL MFIS, INCLUDE NEW PLAYERS,
AND CREATE A SUPPORTING REGULATORY FRAMEWORK

Although the new Microfinance Decree helps establish some
predictability and stability in the microfinance system, the new regulatory
scheme has a long way to go before it can truly enable MFIs operating in
Vietnam. During its final assessment of the new law, the ADB stated that “it
is expected that the decree will mark an improvement in the policy
environment, but will still fall short of a genuinely enabling decree.”160 The
Vietnam regulatory scheme could be vastly improved by finding a way to
accommodate small MFIs, addressing the issue of interest rate subsidies,
finding a way to include international and commercial players, and making
sure that the regulatory framework that is in place is effectively
administered.
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The Microfinance Framework in Vietnam Should Be Altered to
Encourage the Growth of Small MFIs

Rather than enabling the growth of the microfinance sector, the
Microfinance Decree instead threatens the viability of small, grassroots
MFIs. As discussed,161 the Microfinance Decree sets capital requirements
and reporting standards with which cash-strapped MFIs find it difficult to
comply.162 Vietnam could adjust its framework to accommodate these
smaller MFIs in a number of ways. Perhaps the easiest way would be to
exempt MFIs under a certain size from complying with regulations. These
MFIs are so small that they do not pose a systemic threat to the Vietnamese
banking system. At the very least, the small MFIs could be given an
extended time period before they have to comply so that they can build
capital to meet the Microfinance Decree’s requirements.
If Vietnam is unwilling to exempt small MFIs, another option is to
create a separate category for MFIs under a certain size. The Microfinance
Decree has two tiers for requirements: one for non-deposit-taking
institutions and another for deposit-taking institutions.163 Adding a third tier
for small MFIs that meet certain requirements would allow the government
to maintain some control over MFIs while still leaving a place for small
MFIs within the system.
B.

Vietnam’s Microfinance Legal Framework Should Include
Commercial and International Players

In addition to taking further steps to protect existing MFIs, Vietnam
should modify the current framework to include new players. The current
regulations reinforce the status quo by allowing only domestic, non-profit
entities to operate as MFIs.164 Although the Microfinance Decree allows
foreign and commercial groups to invest in existing MFIs, it is vague as to
what role these groups may have in directing the day-to-day affairs of MFIs
in which they invest.165 Lawmakers should modify the existing framework
by changing the provisions that restrict foreign and commercial entities. If
the Vietnamese government has specific concerns about these entities, they
could include requirements that guarantee MFIs run by these entities still
meet social objectives. For example, the Vietnamese government could
161
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include consumer protection provisions to ensure that commercial MFIs do
not take advantage of their customers.
If the Microfinance Decree is not modified to allow these new players
to own MFIs outright, policy-makers should, at the very least, alter the law
to clarify the status of commercial and foreign entities investing in existing
MFIs. Foreign and commercial partners may be unwilling to contribute
money to MFIs when there is no guarantee that the funds will be used
according to their wishes. Commercial entities in particular may be
unwilling to bear the risk of partnering with MFIs if their claim on funds is
tenuous. Although commercial players are just beginning to take part in the
global microfinance industry, many predict that commercially-driven
microfinance projects will be the next wave of growth.166 If Vietnam does
not take steps to clarify the status of commercial investors, MFIs in the
country may be passed over for MFIs in countries where the status is clearer.
Cutting off this valuable source of potential funds is short-sighted and does
not enable Vietnam to participate in the global MFI market to the same
extent as other countries in the region.
C.

Vietnam’s New Microfinance Law Can Enable Growth Only If It Is
Supported by Enabling Regulations

Even with the positive changes outlined in the Microfinance Decree,
the new law on microfinance will not create an enabling environment unless
it is actually implemented. The Microfinance Decree indicates a number of
future regulations which must be promulgated by the State Bank.167
Drafting these regulations will require a large amount of funding and
expertise. In 2005, the ADB launched a technical assistance program which
authorized $315,000 in funding to help Vietnam follow through with the
creation of the necessary supporting regulatory framework.168 This technical
assistance program will not only assist with drafting legal documents, but
will also provide training for State Bank staff and workshops for MFIs.169
The technical assistance program also includes funds for sending two
delegations of government officials on study tours of other Asian countries
that already have strong, well-developed microfinance regulatory
structures.170
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Although the ADB technical assistance program will help to establish
a strong foundation, the State Bank must make implementation a key focus
in order for the Microfinance Decree to enable the microfinance industry in
Vietnam. MFIs may have very little incentive to follow the industry best
practices outlined in the Microfinance Decree if there is no oversight. MFIs
will also be more incentivized to comply with reporting procedures if the
data gathered is used to create more favorable policy. Perhaps most
importantly, in order for the new Microfinance Decree to create stability and
predictability, the regulations that support it must also be clear,
unambiguous, and easy to navigate. Without an easy-to-navigate regulatory
scheme, MFIs may still hesitate to expand current offerings or start new
programs.
VI.

CONCLUSION

With the assistance of the ADB, Vietnam joined the ranks of a
growing number of countries that have created a special legal and regulatory
framework for MFIs. Although the Microfinance Decree helps to provide
more stability and predictability, the new law also contains provisions which
place undue burdens on small MFIs and unnecessarily limit the participation
of foreign and domestic entities. In order for the new law to truly enable the
growth of microfinance, Vietnam needs to accommodate small MFIs,
include measures to encourage the participation of new types of MFIs, and
make sure that the provisions already in place are actually implemented. If
Vietnam continues to move towards a truly enabling environment, it will be
able to build from a solid foundation and help its poorest citizens become
full participants in Vietnam’s growing economy.

